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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Joaquin Garza appeals

the judgment

upon

jury verdict

district court committed

finding him guilty of aggravated battery, claiming
evidentiary error under I.R.E. 609.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Garza with aggravated battery, and, on an alternative
theory, aiding and abetting the aggravated battery of Jayme Madler. 1 (R., pp.2526.) The state subsequently added a persistent violator allegation against Garza.
(R., pp.56-58.) At trial, the following testimony and evidence was presented.

A.

State's Case:
1.

Jayme Madler

On the evening of February 29, 201

28 year-old Jayme Madler took a

to the Getaway Bar in Nampa to play "beer pong" with a couple of
friends. (Tr., p.257, Ls.2-3; p.260, Ls.4-1

About five minutes after arriving at

the bar, an acquaintance named Michael St. Peter asked him to go outside
about a matter, and when they did, five others joined St. Peter in threatening
to beat Jayme up for allegedly getting one of their friends, Isaac Rodriquez, in

1

Jayme Madler also is known as "Gus." (Tr., p

1

, Ls.23-24.)

trouble. 2 (Tr., p.262, L.20 - p.264, L.12.) Jayme told them he did not want any
drama and went back into the bar. (Tr., p.264, Ls.12-20.)
During the next several hours, while Jayme remained in the bar playing
beer pong and visiting friends, he noticed individuals at St. Peter's table, which at
some point included Garza, 3 continued to give him "dirty looks" and "dirty
glances." (Tr., p.264, L.24 - p.265, L.7.) At about midnight, Jayme left the bar
out the back door to get cigarettes from his friend's car in the back parking lot.
(Tr., p.269, L.1 - p.270, L.2.) As Jayme started to unlock the car, "some guy took
a swing at [him], so [he] ducked and took off ... " (Tr., p.270, Ls.18-23.) When
Jayme started to run, Garza "approached him with the other guy on [Jayme's] tail
and swung at [Jayme]", and then Garza chased Jayme. (Tr., p.270, Ls.24-25;
p.272, Ls.22-25; p.279, L.21 - p.280, L.5; p.298, L.17-19.) While being chased,
Jayme ran through the parking lot toward the front door of the bar, but before
reaching safety, he was tackled and knocked unconscious until he came back to
consciousness and noticed he was missing three front teeth, his lip was split, his
nose was torn open, and his eyes were swollen. (Tr., p.273, L.1 - p. 274, L.7.)
Although an ambulance was summoned, Jayme refused to spend the "$1000 to
go down the road," and had his stepbrother take him to the hospital. (Tr., p.274,
Ls.12-21.)

2

Jayme had just broken up with his girlfriend, Maria Rodriguez, who is Isaac
Rodriguez's sister. (Tr., p.259, L.11 - p.260, L.3.)

Jayme had known Garza for four or five years, and identified him in open court
as Joaquin Garza. (Tr., p.258, L.10 - p.259, L.23.)
3

2

2.

Dr. Jeffrey Dingman
at the emergency room,

determined Jayme suffered lacerations to
all requiring sutures.

nose, lip, and area under his chin,

(Tr., p.212, L.25 - p.213, L.2; p.214, L.12 - p.216, L.B.)

Jayme's lip laceration was caused by a tooth going through it. (Tr., p. 217, Ls.610.)

Jayme also had three fractures of his right orbital wall, one of which

extended to the top part of his jaw. (Tr., p. 219, L.23 - p.221,

10.) Dr. Dingman

also noted that Jayme suffered a series of cracked teeth. (Tr., p.223, Ls.14-21.)

3.

Chelsea Baker

Chelsea Baker was a waitress at the Getaway Bar and knew Garza, St.
Peter, Cameron Schink and Megan Demelo from high school. (Tr., p.226, L.15
p.227,

.) On the night of the incident, Ms. Baker saw Jayme playing beer

pong in the bar while St. Peter sat with Garza, Schink, and Demelo by the back
door. (Tr., p.231, L.4 - p.232, L.23.) Ms. Baker went to St. Peter's table once to
say hello to Garza.

(Tr., p.245, Ls.4-8.)

When shown video taken by a

surveillance camera inside the bar that evening (St. Ex. 23), Ms. Baker identified
several people leaving the bar at about 12:30 a.m., including
wearing a lighter color sweatshirt. (Tr.,
p.231,

173, Ls.4-19; p.177,

16-19; p.233, L.14 - p.234, L.21; St.

23.)

, who was
11 - p.178, L.18;

Baker also identified

Garza as one of the people that an outside surveillance camera caught running
outside in the parking lot after leaving the bar from the back door and the outside
enclosed smoking area. (Tr., p.181, L.19- p.182, L.9; p.234, L.25- p.236, L.15;
St. Ex. 24, at 00:32:17-19.) Ms. Baker later identified Garza from a photo-lineup
3

by

evening.

4.

enforcement, as a person who was in the Getaway
156, L.19 - p.157, L.3; p.237, L.10 - p.238, L.12; St. Ex.

Gerlyn Green

Gerlyn Green was a taxi driver for A 1 Stop-N-Go in Nampa, and her
company had a contract with the Getaway Bar for taxi service to be made
available to patrons for a discounted rate.

(Tr., p.303, Ls.2-23.) On the night

Jayme was beaten, Ms. Green was in her taxi, parked next to the front door.
(Tr., p.304, Ls.12-20; p.305, L.15 - p.306, L.13.)

Ms. Green testified that she

witnessed Garza participate in the beating of Jayme:
/',

paperwork -- and typically there's a lot
2Hound in the parking lot They're drunk. They
do that usually -- and I saw three people run down the alley behind.
I thought that was weird. And at that point I didn't think too much of
the three people running. And around the corner came three
people dragging a guy, and they were hitting him and yelling and
stuff. I couldn't hear what they were saying at the time. But they
drug him pretty much from the back of this corner here all the way
to where that circle is there, and they continued to beat him. He
was already unconscious about halfway in between.
1;::J

Q. Okay. So let me follow up. When you say alley, do you mean
parking lot there?

A. Well, the alley is behind, right here. So they pulled him from
behind, obviously, around all the cars that were parked there, and
he was right there where this black circle is. That's pretty much
where one person decided they should finish him off, and there was
one person holding him and two people kicking and hitting him the
whole time. He was already bloody and unconscious. It was kind
of pointless.
(Tr., p.308, L.9 - p.309, L.6.)
Ms. Baker testified that, as she sat in her taxi, her window was open and
the three men were between 10 to 15 feet away from her -- coming closest as
4

they were 10 feet away from her cab. (Tr., p.309, Ls.·14-25.) When asked if all
three people were participants in "what was going on," Ms. Baker responded,
"[o]ne of them was holding up the one guy, and the other two were actively
beating the hell out of him.
p.310, Ls.16-21.)

So I would say all three were participating." (Tr.,

Ms. Baker said there was a light overhead on the building,

and that two of the attackers were dressed in dark, hoodie-type shirts, and one
was in a light-colored jacket.

(Tr., p.311, Ls.1-12.) When asked if she got a

good look at the faces of any of the three men, she testified:
A.
I only got a really good look at one. And that was because
when he made a comment, he said, "Let's finish him off/ I thought,
Oh, my hell. I jumped out of my cab, and I said, "What?" And he
looked up at me, and that's when I saw his face clearly in the light.
Q. Okay. What happened after that?

A. They ran because they didn't realize there was somebody sitting
right there in a car I'm sure. They were a little busy.
Q. Okay. Do you remember what that one person looks like?

A. Uh-huh.
Q. Do you see him in the courtroom today?
A. Yes, I do.
(Tr., p.311, L.17 - p.312, L.8.) Ms. Baker then identified Garza, in court, as the
"one person" who had said, "Let's finish him off," and whose face she had clearly
seen in the light. (Tr., p.312, Ls.9-16.) Shortly after the incident, Ms. Baker also
identified Garza in a photo lineup prepared by law enforcement.
Ls.11-18; p.313, L.5 - p.314, L.4; St. Ex. 20.)

5

(Tr., p.156,

5,

Detective Troy Hale

Detective Troy Hale conducted a taped interview with Garza several
weeks after Jayme was beaten, and Garza repeatedly denied ever having been
at the Getaway Bar, much less the evening of the incident, and said he did not
remember where he was at the time, although he may have been with a girl, but
preferred not to say her name. (Tr., p.337, L.4 - p,338, L.2; see generally St. Ex.
28,)

When asked about the fact that a witness said, and the bar's video

surveillance showed, he was in a fight at the bar that night, Garza responded that
both the video and the witness were wrong, and he did not fight with anybody
that night. (St. Ex. 28 at 00:43-00:46, 02:55-03:00.) Garza denied knowing St.
Peter, Schink, and Demelo. (Id.)

B.

Defense Case
1.

Joaquin Garza

Contrary to what he told Detective Hale, Garza testified that, on the night
of the incident, he was, in fact, at the Getaway Bar, and he spoke to St. Peter,
Demelo, and Schink throughout the evening, (Tr., p.356, Ls.7-13; p.360, L.18 p.361, L.12.) Garza said he heard that Jayme had "told on" Isaac Rodriguez and
that Isaac was in jail. (Tr., p.358, L.6

p.359, L.1 0; p.361, L.24 - p.362, L.1.)

Garza was expecting "a one-on-one fight" to occur that night, and when everyone
started running out of the bar into the parking lot, he also ran outside because he
wanted to see what was going to happen.

(Tr., p.365, Ls.5-7; p.367, L.19 -

p.368, L.4.) When Garza stopped running, he saw Jayme on the ground, already
unconscious, and saw St. Peter and a man named "Brooks" "just stomping" on
6

Jayme's face. (Tr., p.368, Ls.2-4; p.369, L. i - p.370, L.18.) Garza said he saw

the taxicab driver outside the bar, and explained that he ran away because he
was scared and did not want to be a suspect or get involved in the incident. (Tr.,
p.371, Ls.7-12; p.372, Ls.16-18).
On cross-examination, Garza admitted lying numerous times during his
police interview by telling Detective Hale he had never been at the Getaway Bar,
and that he did not know St. Peter, Demelo, and Schink - but explained that he
felt intimidated by the detective because he kept suggesting Garza was involved
in the fight when he was not. (Tr., p.375, L.17

p.377, L.12; p.382, L.22 - p.383,

L.3.) Garza admitted that, after he went outside with the others to see what was
going to happen to Jayme, he ran in the parking lot between the cars towards
Jayme, but even though the surveillance video made it look like he was chasing
Jayme and trying to cut him off, when Jayme ran past him, he stopped because
he "didn't want it to look like that." (Tr., p.378, L.15 - p.379, L.6.)

2.

Madison Haueisen

Madison Haueisen testified that she and Garza were friends for a long
time, and she was at the Getaway Bar on the night of the incident with her sister
and other friends.

(Tr., p.385, L.21 - p.386, L.21.)

During the course of the

evening Ms. Haueisen became aware that Jayme had been beaten up, but she
did not witness the fight. (Tr., p.387, L.7 - p.388, L.3.) When Ms. Haueisen left
the bar at closing time, 1:00 a.m., she saw Garza in the parking lot, who did not
look disheveled and did not have any blood on him.
L.4; p.394, Ls.14-24.)

7

(Tr., p.388, L.11 - p.389,

C.

I.R.E. 609 Ruling
During

pursuant

LR.

609,

court permitted, over Garza's

objection, admission of evidence establishing the "fact" that Garza was a
convicted felon, but not the nature of the offense, pursuant to !.R.E. 609. 4 (Tr.,
p.251, L.16 - p.252, L.23.) The admission of such evidence was predicated upon
Garza testifying at trial, and was based on his previous conviction for unlawful
discharge of a firearm at a dwelling. (Id.)
The jury found Garza not guilty of aggravated battery, but found him guilty
of aiding and abetting aggravated battery and of being a persistent violator. (R.,
pp.141-144.) The court imposed a unified sentence of 15 years with five years
fixed. (R., pp.162-163.) Garza filed a Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence,
which was denied. (R., pp.164-168, 188-189.) Garza timely appealed from his
judgment of conviction. (R., pp.173-176.)

4

Although the district court did not expressly state it was admitting the fact of
such conviction under I.R.E. 609, the court's discussion of which of the three
categories of credibility the underlying offense fell is clearly indicative of an I.R.E.
609 analysis. See State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 580-581, 634 P.2d 435, 442443 (1981 ).
8

ISSUE
Garza

on

as:

Did the district court err when it allowed the
to present
609 and over defense objection, that
evidence pursuant to I.R.
Mr. Garza was a convicted felon, as his felony conviction was for a
crime of violence and, thus, did not weigh on his credibility?
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Garza failed to establish error in the district court's conclusion that the
fact of his prior felony conviction was admissible pursuant to I.R.E. 609?

9

ARGUMENT
Garza Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Concluding That The
Fact Of His Prior Conviction Was Admissible Pursuant To I.R.E. 609
A.

Introduction
Garza contends the district court erred in concluding that the fact he had

previously been convicted of a felony was admissible under I.R.E. 609.
Specifically, Garza argues that his conviction for unlawful discharge of a firearm
at a dwelling was not admissible because it "is a crime of violence and, thus, has
no bearing on Mr. Garza's credibility." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Garza's claim fails
for three reasons.
First, Garza has failed to preserve a challenge to the admission of his prior
conviction because his trial objection was based on his contention that the crime
of unlawful discharge of a firearm at a dwelling was not a crime of violence, an
argument diametrically opposed to what he argues on appeal.

Next, although

the district court correctly determined that unlawful discharge of a firearm at a
dwelling is a crime of violence, it concluded such crime "falls within the second
category recognized by our appellate courts as -- which means it can be -- he
can be asked if he's ever been previously convicted of a felony but not the nature
of the felony." 5 (Tr., p.252, Ls.15-20.) Regardless of the court's reasoning, its
admission of the fact that Garza was a convicted felon should be upheld because

In State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 581, 634 P.2d 435, 443 (1981 ), the Idaho
Supreme Court articulated three categories of crimes with varying degrees of
relevance to credibility under I.R.C.P 43(b)(6), the forerunner of I.R.E. 609. The
third category is "Acts of violence ... [which) generally have little or no direct
bearing on honesty and veracity." 11: (quoting People v. Rollo, 20 Cal 3d 109,
141 Cal.Rptr. 177,569 P.2d 771,775 (1977)).
5

10

his prior conviction was pmbative of credibility, even though it was a vioient
offense.

See State v. Stewart, 149 Idaho 383, 234 P.3d 707, 712 (2010)

(affirming denial of motion on correct theory, one not reached by trial court);
McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999) (if trial court
reaches the correct result by incorrect theory, appellate court will affirm upon the
correct theory). Finally, even if the court erred in admitting the fact that Garza
had a prior felony conviction, such error was harmless given the overwhelming
evidence -- especially eyewitness testimony -- proving Garza's guilt.

B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its

judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion.
State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 521, 81 P.3d 1230, 1231 (2003). Relevance of a
prior conviction is a question of law reviewed de nova while the prejudicial impact
of such evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Thompson, 132
Idaho 628, 630, 977 P.2d 890, 892 (1999) (citing State v. Raudebaugh, 124
Idaho 758, 766, 864 P.2d 596,604 (1993)).

C.

Garza Failed To Preserve For Apoeal His Claim That It Was Error, Under
I.R.E. 609, To Admit The Fact That He Was A Convicted Felon
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the court below before an issue is preserved for
appeal. The specific ground for the objection must also be clearly stated." State
v. Gleason, 130 Idaho 586, 592, 944 P.2d 721, 727 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing 1.R.E.
103(a)(1 ); State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 940, 877 P.2d 905 (1994)).

11

"For an

either

be

objection must be clearly stated, or the basis of the

ground for
must

apparent

from the context." State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 602, 301 P.3d 242, 260
(2013)

(quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 277, 77 P.3d 956, 966

(2003)); see also I.R.E. 103(a)(1 ).

Objecting to the admission of evidence on

one basis does not preserve a separate and different basis for exclusion of the
evidence. State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 892, 896, 894 P.2d 125 (1995); State v.
Higgins, 122 Idaho 590, 596, 836 P.2d 536 (1992); State v. Fordyce, 151 Idaho
868, 871, 264 P.3d 975, 978 (Ct. App. 2011 ); State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389,
398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000); Gleason, 130 Idaho at 592, 944 P.2d at 727.
During trial and outside the jury's presence, the district court explained
that the state was offering evidence of the fact that Garza was a convicted felon
based on his conviction for unlawful discharge of a firearm at a dwelling, I.C. §
18-3317, and the prosecutor concurred with that assessment. 6 (Tr., p.252, Ls.610.)

The court then added, "And being a crime of violence I presume that's

correct." (Tr., p.252, Ls.11

2.) When the court asked defense counsel "your

thoughts on that?[,]" counsel said "I will be objecting to that" (Tr., p.252, Ls.13-

6

Idaho Code § 18-3317 reads in relevant part:
Unlawful discharge of a firearm at a dwelling house, occupied
building, vehicle or mobile home. -- It shall be unlawful for any
person to intentionally and unlawfully discharge a firearm at an
inhabited dwelling house, occupied building, occupied motor
vehicle, inhabited mobile home, inhabited travel trailer, or inhabited
camper ....
As used in this section, "inhabited" means currently being
used for dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not.
12

14.) Shortly after that exchange, defense counsel made clear his objection was
based on the characterization of Garza's prior conviction as a violent offense:
[Defense Counsel]: Judge, the nature of my objection is I'm not
sure that there is case law on point regarding discharge of a firearm
on a dwelling being a violent offense. I don't believe in itself it is
necessarily a crime of violence. I really cannot find any Idaho case
law on point.
THE COURT: I think the crime of discharge of a firearm at an
occupied dwelling.
[Defense Counsel]: ! just wanted my objection to be noted.
THE COURT: I understand your objection, but I think clearly that is
a crime of violence that carries with it a threat of injury to people,
and that's the reason it's made criminal.
(Tr., p.253, Ls.3-16.) Just before Garza testified, the court reiterated its "ruling
on the felony conviction is that it's a crime of violence," and that only the fact of a
felony conviction, not the nature of the charge, would be admitted. (Tr., p.353,
L.24 - p.354, L.14.)
On appeal, Garza argues that because the crime of unlawful discharge of

a firearm at a dwelling is a violent offense, it falls within the third category of
Ybarra, and is not relevant to credibility. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-11.) There is no
question that Garza made a contrary argument during trial, contending the prior
offense was not a crime of violence. (Tr., p.253, Ls.3-12.) Because Garza did
not object to the I.R.E. 609 evidence _at trial on the same basis that he does on
appeal, he has failed to preserve for appeal the issue of whether the court erred
in admitting evidence that he was a convicted felon. Johnson, 126 Idaho at 896,

894 P.2d 125; Higgins, 122 Idaho at 596, 836 P.2d 536; Fordyce, 151 Idaho at
871, 264 P.3d at 978. This Court should therefore decline to consider the issue.
13

0,

The District Court Correctly Concluded That Reference To The Fact That
Garza Had Previously Been Convicted Of A Felony Was Permissible
Rule 609(a), I.RE., provides, in relevant part:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence of
the fact that the witness has been convicted of a felony and the
nature of the felony shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or
established by public record, but only if the court determines in a
hearing outside the presence of the jury that the fact of the prior
conviction or the nature of the prior conviction, or both, are relevant
to the credibility of the witness and that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the party
offering the witness.
In deciding whether a prior felony conviction is admissible under I.RE.

609, a district court "must apply a two-prong test." State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho
628, 630, 977 P.2d 890, 892 (1999). First, "the court must determine whether
the fact or nature of the conviction is relevant to the witness' credibility."

kl

Second, "the court must determine whether the probative value of the evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect." 7

kl

With respect to the first prong, the Idaho

Supreme Court has stated
that "different felonies have different degrees of probative value on
the issue of credibility. Some, such as perjury, are intimately
connected with that issue; others, such as robbery and burglary,
are somewhat less relevant; and [a]cts of violence ... generally
have little or no direct bearing on honesty and veracity."

Garza does not argue that the district court erred by allegedly failing to conduct
the balancing analysis described by the second prong of the test for admissibility
under 1.R.E. 609. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.8-11.) Nonetheless, the district court
considered and minimized the prejudicial effect of the prior felony conviction by
prohibiting the nature of the conviction from being revealed to the jury, which, in
effect, balanced the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect.
See Rodgers, 119 Idaho at 1072-1073, 812 P.2d at 1233-1234.
7
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Ybarra, 102 Idaho at 580-581. 634 P.2d at 442-443 (quoting Rolio, 569 P.2d at

775 (alteration added, ellipses original). The Court has further stated that "[t]he
determination whether evidence of a particular felony conviction is relevant to

credibility depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case and
must therefore be decided on a case-by-case basis." State v. Bush, 131 Idaho
22, 31,951 P.2d 1249, 1258 (1997).
Rule 609 conditions the admission of impeachment evidence of other
crimes on its relevance to the credibility of the witness. Credibility, however, is
not a concept limited to crimes of dishonesty or false statement.

Instead, the

question of credibility is most concerned with a defendant's manifest disrespect
for the law. See State v. Pierce, 107 Idaho 96, 108, 685 P .2d 837, 844 (Ct. App.
1984); State v. Rodgers, 119 Idaho 1066, 812 P.2d 1227 (Ct. App. 1990), aff'd,
119 Idaho 1047, 812 P.2d 1208 (1991).
In Pierce, 107 Idaho at 108, 685 P.2d at 844, a defendant charged with
robbery was impeached with prior felony convictions for injury to a public jail,
resisting police officers and delivery of heroin.

Notwithstanding the lack of a

literal nexus between these crimes and dishonesty, the Court found them to be
sufficiently relevant to the defendant's credibility to satisfy the purposes of former
I.R.C.P. 43(b)(6), the predecessor to Rule 609, explaining:
The record before us discloses that Pierce's prior felony
convictions were comprised, as noted, of injury to a public jail and
resisting or obstructing police officers, incident to escape. An
additional conviction for delivery of heroin also appears of record. It
would be straining at language to characterize any of these
offenses as crimes of "dishonesty or false statement." Neither are
they limited to crimes of violence or sudden impulse. Rather, they
are akin to offenses in the middle range of relevancy to credibility,
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identified in Ybarra []. They are crimes which exhibit intentional
deviations from legally prescribed standards
conduct. They
show a pattern of disrespect for law and lawful authority. In our
view, such established disrespect is relevant to evaluating whether
Pierce would take an oath seriously as a witness and whether he
would hesitate to testify untruthfully if it seemed advantageous to
do so. These concerns are fundamental to the truth seeking
objective of our criminal justice system.
Therefore, we believe that Pierce's prior felonies plainly had
probative value on the question of his credibility. Although not
required by present Rule 43(b)(6), we would also ascribe greater
weight to this probative value than to the prejudicial effect of
impeachment -- particularly in view of the fact that the district judge
permitted reference only to the fact of prior conviction, not to the
number or nature of the felonies involved. We conclude that the
district judge did not err by allowing this limited impeachment, even
though the reason he gave for doing so was incorrect.
(Emphasis added.);

also Bush, 131 Idaho at 31, 951 P.2d 1258 (Wyoming

prior for "immoral acts with a child" admissible); State v. Muraco, 132 Idaho 130,
968 P.2d 225 (1998) (Nevada prior for "lewdness with a minor" admissible);
Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 977 P.2d 890 (Idaho prior for "sexual battery"
admissible).
In Rodgers,119 Idaho 1066, 812 P.2d 1227, aff'd, 119 Idaho 1047, 812
P.2d 1208, the Idaho Court of Appeals explained that I.R.

609 allows some

violent crimes -- including the second degree murder conviction proffered in that
case -- to serve as the basis to admit testimony that a witness has been
convicted of a felony. The Idaho Court of Appeals explained:
There has been much discussion in the cases regarding the
relationships between felony convictions and witness credibility.
We acknowledge that different felonies have differing degrees of
probative value regarding the issue of credibility. State v. Ybarra,
102 Idaho 573, 634 P.2d 435 (1981), identifies three categories of
felonies. The first category recognizes crimes such as perjury that
have direct bearing on credibility because they deal with honesty or
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veracity. The second category includes crimes such as burglary or
robbery which have less evidence bearing on credibility due to their
indirect dealing with veracity and have only a general relationship to
honesty. The third category are those crimes described as acts of
violence. In Ybarra, our Supreme Court, quoting People v. Rollo,
20 Cal.3d 109, 141 Cal.Rptr. 177, 569 P.2d 771, 775 (1977), noted
that "Acts of violence ... generally have little or no direct bearing on
honesty and veracity." 102 Idaho at 581, 634 P.2d at 443. See
also State v. Allen, 113 Idaho 676, 747 P.2d 85 (Ct. App. 1987).

Not all acts of violence are products of uncontrolled passion
or emotional impulse, however. In California, murder in the second
degree is an unlawful killing of a human being with "malice
aforethought." "An intent to kill" or circumstances showing "an
abandoned and malignant heart" are manifested by the perpetrator
of such a crime. While such a crime has no "direct bearing" on
credibility, it nevertheless has a significant bearing much the same
as the crimes of burglary and robbery. In Ybarra, the Supreme
Court quoted the following language from Ladd, Credibility TestCurrent Trends, 89 Univ.Pa.L.Rev. 166, 180 (1940):
On the other hand robbery, larceny, and burglary,
while not showing a propensity to falsify, do disclose a
disregard for the rights of others which might
reasonably be expected to express itself in giving
false testimony whenever it would be to the
advantage of the witness. If the witness had no
compunction against stealing another's property or
taking it away from him by physical threat or force, it
is hard to see why he would hesitate to obtain an
advantage for himself or friend in a trial by giving false
testimony. Furthermore, such criminal acts, although
evidenced by a single conviction, may represent such
a marked break from sanctioned conduct that it
affords a reasonable basis of future prediction upon
credibility ....

It can also be said that if a witness had no compunction against
deliberately taking another's life away by physical force, it is hard to
see why he would hesitate to obtain an advantage for himself in a
trial by giving false testimony. Following this reasoning, we hold
that the trial court was correct in concluding that the impeachment
value of the crime of murder in the second degree is "substantial."
Rodgers, 119 Idaho at 1072, 812 P.2d at 1233 (emphasis added).
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Similar to Rodgers,

prior

district court

conviction was

his

despite

fact

it was a

crime of violence. That offense consists of an intentional and unlawful discharge
a firearm at a dwelling -- not a crime which is the "product[] of uncontrolled
passion or emotional impulse[.]"

kL

see State v. Grist, 152 Idaho 786, 789, 275

P.3d 12, 15 (Ct. App. 2012) ("Offenses in the third category, which include crimes
of passion and acts of violence that are the product of emotional impulse, have
been said to have little or no direct bearing on honesty and veracity."). Here, as
in Rodgers, "[i]t can also be said that if a witness had no compunction against
deliberately [discharging a firearm at a dwelling], it is hard to see why he would
hesitate to obtain an advantage for himself in a trial by giving false testimony."
Rodgers, 119 Idaho at 1072, 812 P .2d at 1233.
Garza's prior conviction for intentionally discharging a firearm into a
dwelling exhibits an exceptionally blatant and intentional deviation from the law,
one that is not based on a momentary flare-up of passion or emotion. Although it
is clearly a crime of violence, it is one that, like the second degree murder
conviction in Rodgers, evinces a pattern of disrespect for lawful authority, and
should cause little question about whether Garza "would hesitate to obtain an
advantage for himself in a trial by giving false testimony." 1.9.:.

Because the

district court's admission of such evidence was a correct result, it should be
affirmed for the alternate reasons expressed above.

Stewart, 149 Idaho 383,

234 P.3d at 712; McKinney, 133 Idaho at 700, 992 P.2d at 149.
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Even If The District Court Erred In Admitting The Fact That Garza Vvas
Previously Convicted Of A Felony, The Error Was Harmless
if

Court concludes

court

the jury could be made aware of the

in

that Garza had previously been

convicted of a felony, the error was harmless.
Idaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."

"The

inquiry is whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have
convicted [Garza] even without the admission of the challenged evidence." State
v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) (citing Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18
(1999)); see also State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
Based on the trial testimony, as set forth in the Statement Of Facts, supra, even
without the admission of evidence that Garza was a convicted felon, this Court
should find that, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted
Garza of aggravated battery. 8
Especially compelling was the testimony of the taxicab driver, Gerlyn
Green, who was a completely neutral and detached witness to the incident. She
testified that, as she sat in her taxi, she watched -- from 15 feet to as close as 10
feet away -- as three people dragged an unconscious Jayme from around a
corner and, while one man held him up, the other two men kicked and hit him.

8

Inasmuch as Garza admitted telling numerous lies to Detective Hale -- denying
he was at the Getaway Bar the night Jayme was beaten and that he knew St.
Peter, Demolo, and Schink -- the jury's view of Garza could not have been much
more negatively affected by merely knowing he was a convicted felon.
19

(Tr., p.252, Ls.15-20; p.308, L.9 - p.309, L.6; p.310, Ls.16-21; p.311, L.17 p.312, L.16.)

Ms. Green clearly identified Garza as one of the men who was

either holding Jayme up, or kicking and hitting him, testifying:

I only got a really good look at one. And that was because
when he made a comment, he said, "Let's finish him off," I thought,
Oh, my hell. I jumped out of my cab, and I said, "What?" And he
looked up at me, and that's when I saw his face clearly in the light.
(Tr., p.311, Ls.19-24.) Ms. Green identified Garza, both through a police photo
line-up and in court, as the person whose face she clearly saw in the light, and
who had caused her to jump out of her cab when she heard him say, "Let's finish
him off." (Tr., p.312, L.4 - p.314, L.4.) Given the overwhelming proof that Garza
participated as an aider and abettor in the aggravated battery of Jayme, any error
inherent in the jury being informed that Garza was a convicted felon was, beyond
a reasonable doubt, harmless.

9

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Garza's judgment of
conviction for aggravated battery.
DATED this 13 th day of March, 2014.

C. McKINNEY / )
uty Attorney GeneraV

u

The district court's I.R.E. 609 ruling has no impact on the jury's post-verdict
finding that Garza was a persistent violator, as alleged in Part Two of the
Information, and Garza does not claim otherwise.
9
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